Louisiana Law Review
Volume 37 | Number 5
Summer 1977

Aldinger v. Howard: A Possible Problem for
Pendent Parties?
Guy Holdridge

Repository Citation
Guy Holdridge, Aldinger v. Howard: A Possible Problem for Pendent Parties?, 37 La. L. Rev. (1977)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol37/iss5/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

1202

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

Due v. Due continues a recent trend in the recognition of pro rata
apportionment as a means of determining the classification of assets
acquired over a period of time which spans a change in the marital
relation. Unfortunately the Civil Code does not seem to contemplate the
division of a single asset into both community and separate property, even
though the instances requiring such an apportionment are becoming increasingly prevalent. The Louisiana legislature, in its current reevaluation
of the community property system, should consider providing a statutory
framework to alleviate this problem. Not only should the method of
classification be examined, but the legislature should also develop a means
by which the working spouse may be protected from paying the nonworking spouse one half of the community assets before he receives the
compensation. The legislature should also prevent the working spouse,
after the community is dissolved, from being able to divest himself, and
therefore the community, of the asset in fraud of his former spouse's
rights. Until this framework is achieved, the courts will be forced to rely
on a strained interpretation of the law in order to achieve the Code's
underlying principles.
Kenneth L. Hickman

ALDINGER V. HOWARD:

A

POSSIBLE PROBLEM

FOR PENDENT PARTIES?

A county employee was dismissed from her job by the defendant, the
Spokane County treasurer, and filed suit in United States District Court
claiming, under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 that the
discharge violated her substantive constitutional rights under the first,
ninth, and fourteenth amendments. Federal jurisdiction for this claim was
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).2 Plaintiff further asserted a claim under
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970): "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, or usage, of any state or territory, subjects or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: . ..
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, statute, ordinance,
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state law 3 against the county and based jurisdiction on the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.' The federal district and appellate courts

rejected the pendent party claim against the county due to a lack of
jurisdiction. 5 The United States Supreme Court, while not forbidding the
adding of pendent parties in other circumstances, held that pendent jurisdiction cannot be used to add a state claim against a party over whom there
is no independent jurisdictional basis when the statute upon which the
original claim is based expressly or by implication negates the existence of
federal jurisdiction over the "pendent" party. Aldinger v. Howard, 427
U.S. 1 (1976).
The source and constitutional basis for the judicial power of the
federal courts is found in article III, section 2 of the Constitution which
states in part, "The judicial power shall extend to all cases . . . , arising
under the Constitution, [and] the laws of the United States . . .,6 This

constitutional authority is implemented by Congress through statutes establishing the jurisdictional bases of the federal courts, such as diversity of
citizenship, 7 existence of a federal question,8 or some other special jurisdictional status. 9 It is within this constitutional framework and the congressional implementing statutes that the federal judicial system must
operate.' ° The court's authority within this system is stated in terms of
regulation, custom, or usage, of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.120 (1953) (statute provides for vicarious liability
of counties in certain circumstances).
4. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
5. Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d 1257, 1260-62 (1975).
6. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 8 at 17-19 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]; Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and
Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. PIrr. L. REV. 759, 760-61 (1972).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000 . . .and is between-(1) citizens of different states . ..."
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
$10,000, ...
States."
9. Id. §§ 1333-1362 (1970). E.g., id. § 1343(3) (1970) (see note 2, supra).
10. WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 8 at 18. See also Baker, supra note 6, at 760-61;
Seid, The Tail Wags the Dog: Hagans v. Lavine and Pendent Jurisdiction, 53 J.
URB. L. 1, 2 (1975); Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts,
20 STAN. L. REV. 262 (1968); Comment, Pendent Jurisdictionand Ancillary Juris-
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"cases."'" It is through an expanded application of this term that the
federal courts have been able to broaden their jurisdictional limits by the
development of the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction.12
The development of the court's jurisdiction via a broad definition of
"cases" is traceable to Osborn v. Bank of the United States' 3 where
defendant questioned the right of Congress to give the bank power to sue
in federal court. Defendant argued that the court, in this case, would not
be exercising article III jurisdiction since questions would be raised which
were not dependent on the construction of a law of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall, in answering this question, asserted that when the
original action involves a question to which the "judicial power of the
union is extended by the Constitution," state issues or other questions of
law or fact necessary for the determination of the original action are within
the jurisdiction granted to the federal courts by article III of the
Constitution. 14
Further development and expansion of the court's jurisdiction occurred in Siler v. Louisville and Nashville Railway Co. 1 in which the
Supreme Court addressed the question whether a state commission's order
establishing maximum railroad rates under a Kentucky statute was in
violation of the fourteenth amendment. The court avoided basing its
decision on the constitutional issue by holding that the state statute did not
6 Relying on its judicial
authorize the commission to act in such a manner. 1
power to decide cases, the court declared that it has the right to decide "all
questions in a case" even if it does not decide the federal claim at all but
decides the case on the local or state question only. 17
The development and enlargement of the court's jurisdiction through
diction: Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1263 (1975);
Note, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 1631, 1632 (1966).
11.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

12. See, e.g., UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (a federal claim and a
pendent state claim comprise but one constitutional "case"); WRIGHT, supra note
6, § 9 at 19; Walsh, If This be Treason. .

.

. 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 489, 490 (1973);

Note, 4 U. TOL. L. REV. 201, 216 (1973).
13. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). For a general discussion of the background
cases which have led to the development of pendent jurisdiction, see C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567 at 439 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]; WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 19 at 62; Note, 62

COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1019 (1962); Note, 62 VA. L. REV. 194, 198 (1976).
14. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 822-23 (1824).
15. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
16. Id. at 198.
17. Id. at 191.
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an expanded definition of the term "cases" led to the establishment of

pendent jurisdiction 8 in Hum v. Oursler 19 where the court's jurisdiction
was expanded to cover not only state issues involved in a federal suit but
also state claims arising from the same transaction as the federal claim.
The original action in Hum involved a federal statutory claim for copyright infringement accompanied by a non-federal claim of unfair competition due to the plagiarism of a copyrighted play. Both claims arose from
the same transaction and rested upon identical facts. The court held that
even though the federal claim was dismissed on its merits, there was still
jurisdiction in the federal court to hear the state claim.20 The standard to be
used to decide when this "pendent" jurisdiction exists was discussed by
the court, and a two-part rule emerged. First, a substantial federal question
must be the basis for the original claim; and second, the federal and nonfederal claims must be but different grounds asserted in support of a
"single cause of action." 2 Determining what constitutes a "single cause
of action" created difficulties 'for the lower federal courts. 22 Since there
was no exact definition of the phrase "cause of action,''23 each court
individually determined the extent to which it would allow pendent jurisdiction to be used. The decisions of the courts in defining what constituted
24
a "single cause of action" ranged from "substantial identical evidence'
25
or "substantial overlapping of evidence" to a liberal definition allowing
18. "Pendent jurisdiction" is the term used to explain a federal court's exercise
of original jurisdiction over a claim which, standing alone, would not be within the
jurisdiction of the court, but which is closely related to a substantial claim within
the court's jurisdiction. See Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction-TheProblem of "Pendenting Parties", 34 U. P'rr. L. REV. 1 (1972). The first use of the term "pendent
jurisdiction" was in Best & Co. v. Miller, 67 F. Supp. 809 (S.D. N.Y. 1946), aff'd,
167 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1948); see Pendent Jurisdictionand Ancillary Jurisdiction,
supra note 10, at 1268 n.29.
19. 289 U.S. 238 (1933). For a discussion of Hum see Note, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
1018, 1021-30 (1962); Note, 51 IOWA L. REV. 151, 152-53 (1965); Note, 37 IOWA L.
REV. 406 (1952).
20. 289 U.S. at 240.
21. Id. at 246.
22. See, e.g., UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); Strachman v. Palmer,
177 F.2d 427, 431 (1st Cir. 1949) (Magruder, J., concurring); Shulman & Jaegerman,
Some JurisdictionalLimitations on FederalProcedure, 45 YALE L.J. 393, 397-410
(1936); Note, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1022 (1962).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Memphis Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1933)
("cause of action might mean one thing for one purpose and something different for
another").
24. E.g., Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895, 900 (2d Cir. 1943); Aileen Mills
Co. v. Ojay Mills, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also Note, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1029 (1962).
25. E.g., Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9, 11 (2d
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joinder of claims arising out of the same transaction as the federal claim.26
The courts after Hum were in agreement, however, that in order for
pendent jurisdiction to apply, the federal and non-federal claims had to be
brought against the same defendant. 27 For example, the court in New
Orleans Public Belt Railroad v. Wallace28 held that a common law claim
of negligence against one defendant could not be pendent to a federal
claim against another defendant since such a claim against a separate
defendant constituted a separate cause of action. 29 Thus, under the Hum
analysis, a pendent claim against a new party would create a new cause of
action and not fit within the bounds of the "single cause of action" rule.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,3" decided in 1966, modified the
Hurn rule and greatly enlarged the limits of pendent jurisdiction. In
Gibbs, the plaintiff asserted a federal question claim for alleged violations
of section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act as well as a state
claim based on damages suffered in the labor violence. Pendent jurisdiction was used as the jurisdictional basis for the court to hear the state
claim even though different evidence would be needed to sustain the two
claims. The issue was whether relief could be granted under the state claim
even though it did not fall within the Hum "single cause of action" test.
Mr. Justice Brennan, calling the Hum approach "unnecessarily grudging",31 devised a new two-part standard to be used in applying pendent
jurisdiction. 32 First, there must be a federal claim substantial enough to
confer jurisdiction on the court, and both the pendent state claim and the
federal claim must be derived from a "common nucleus of operative
fact." ' 33 If this is present, the federal court has the power to hear the
Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 641 (1942); Treasure Imports v. Henry Amdur & Sons,
127 F.2d 3, 5 (2d Cir. 1942).
26. E.g., Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 454 (9th Cir. 1956).
27. See, e.g., Wojtas v. Village of Niles, 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965); Rumbaugh v. Winifrede R.R., 331 F.2d 530 (4th Cir.
1964); Pearce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 162 F.2d 524 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
765 (1947).
28. 173 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1949).
29. Id. at 148.
30. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). For a discussion of Gibbs, see generally WRIGHT,
supra note 6, § 19 at 64-65; Baker, supra note 6, at 763-68; The Supreme Court 1965
Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 220-24 (1966); Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent
Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1968); Note, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 1631 (1966).
31. 383 U.S. at 725.
32. Id. at 725-26. The Gibbs two-part approach to pendent jurisdiction has
been called a "power-discretion" or "bright-line" test. See Note, UMW v. Gibbs &

Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. REV. 657, 660 (1968).
33. 383 U.S. at 725.
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pendent claim. Second, the court in its discretion must decide whether or
not to exercise this "pendent" power. 34 Justification for hearing a pendent
claim must be found in considerations of "judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants." 35 In dictum, the court implied that the
decision was an attempt to put the pendent jurisdiction doctrine in step
with the policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in which36 the
"joinder of claims, parties, and remedies is strongly encouraged."
The availability of pendent jurisdiction was expanded by the Court in
Hagans v. Lavine37 where the plaintiff asserted, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
that a New York state regulation violated her constitutional rights under
the fourteenth amendment. Pendent to the federal claim was a statutory
supremacy claim involving an alleged conflict between the state regulation
and a federal regulation implementing the Social Security Act, which did
not have an independent jurisdictional basis because it did not meet the
$10,000 jurisdictional amount required under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 .3 Because the validity of the constitutional claim was questionable, the court
faced the important question of whether a substantial constitutional claim
is needed in order for a plaintiff to bring a pendent claim which has no
independent jurisdictional basis. 39 The majority held that for federal pendent jurisdiction to apply, the original constitutional claim must not be
insubstantial. 4 Allowing a questionable federal claim to be the jurisdictional basis for a pendent claim of course creates greater accessibility to
the federal courts. 4 After Hagans, the possibility arises that a plaintiff
34. Id. at 726.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 724.
37. 415 U.S. 528 (1974) (Powell & Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting). See generally
Seid, supra note 10 (critical of Hagans);Sullivan, Pendent Jurisdiction:The Impact
ofHagans & Moor, 7 IND. L. REV. 925 (1974); Note, 6 CONN. L. REV. 747 (1974).
38. 415 U.S. at 532 (1974).
39. The equal protection claim upon which the jurisdiction of the court was
based apparently was precluded by the Supreme Court's decision in Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), where in a similar situation, it was held that the state
statutory regulation was not a denial of equal protection. Following this reasoning,
the Second Circuit held that the equal protection claim did not present a substantial
constitutional claim and therefore a federal court did not have authority to hear the
pendent claim. Hagans v. Wyman, 471 F.2d 347, 350 (2d Cir. 1973).
40. 415 U.S. at 536-38 (1974). The majority held that only "threshold scrutiny"
was needed to determine if a claim was not insubstantial. If from the pleadings, the
federal claim does not appear "wholly insubstantial," "obviously frivolous," or
"plainly insubstantial," the court will have federal jurisdiction sufficient to entertain a pendent claim. Id.
41. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, argued that the decision would expand
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with a marginal federal claim and a strong state claim will be able to find a
42
forum in the federal courts for both claims.
These liberal jurisprudential developments regarding pendent jurisdiction of claims have led commentators43 and courts" alike to suggest the
possibility of pendent party jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has twice
been faced with the question of whether additional parties may be
"pended" to a state claim which arose from the same "common nucleus
of operative fact" as the original federal claim. In Moor v. County of
Alameda 45 and Philbrook v. Glodgett," the Court avoided the question.
In Moor, plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that their
constitutional rights of free speech, free assembly, and due process were
abridged by the county police officers in quelling a civil rights disturbance. Petitioners also sought damages against the county claiming that it
was vicariously liable for the acts of its officers under the California Tort
Claims Act. 47 The court said the situation of a pendent party presented a
"subtle and complex question with far-reaching implications ' 48 and conveniently avoided any decision on the issue by holding that it was within

the lower court's discretion to refuse to join a pendent claim against the
county.49
pendent jurisdiction beyond the Gibbs discretionary test and would allow the
federal courts to decide cases usually reserved for the state courts.
42. See Seid, supra note 10, at 25; Note, 6 CONN. L. REV. 747, 757-58 (1974).
43. See Baker, supra note 6; Fortune, supra note 18; Sullivan, supra note 37;
Comment, The Federal Courts and the Expanded Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction,
25 BAYLOR L. REV. 256 (1973); Comment, The Expanding Scope of FederalPendent
Jurisdiction, 34 TENN. L. REV. 413 (1967); Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent
Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1967); Note, 62 VA. L. REV. 194 (1976); Note,
66 MICH. L. REV. 373 (1967). But see Shakman, The New PendentJurisdictionof the
Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV 262 (1968) (critizing any extension of pendent

jurisdiction); Comment, The Extension of Pendent Jurisdictionto Parties Not in the
Jurisdiction-ConferringSuit, 20 Loy. L. REV. 176 (1974) (highly critical of inclusion
of pendent parties).
44. Bowers v. Moreno, 520 F.2d 843, 846-48 (1st Cir. 1975); Florida E. Coast
Ry. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1975); Curtiss v. Everette, 489 F.2d
516 (3d Cir. 1973); Niebuhr v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 486 F.2d 618 (10th
Cir. 1973); Schulman v. Huck Finn, Inc., 472 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1973); Astor-Honor,
Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlop, Inc., 441 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1971); F. C. Stiles
Contracting Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1970); Stone v. Stone, 405
F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
45. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
46. 421 U.S. 707 (1975).
47. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 810 et seq. (Deering 1963). The Court, following its
decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), held that a federal claim could not
be brought against a county under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
48. 411 U.S. 693, 715 (1973).
49. Id. The Court held that the refusal to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the
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While the Supreme Court avoided the question of pendent parties the
lower federal courts answered it with differing results. ° For the purposes
of this discussion, the holdings of the federal courts on the pendent party
issue will be divided according to the bases on which the original jurisdiction of the court was invoked, i.e., a federal question or diversity of
parties.
In federal question cases, a majority of the circuit courts allow a
plaintiff to "pend" a state claim against another party over whom there is
no independent federal jurisdiction. 51 In one of the leading cases, AstorHonor, Inc. v. Grosset and Dunlop, Inc. ,52 the Second Circuit 53 was faced
with the dilemma of whether a state claim, based on the same facts as the
federal question claim, could be brought against a party lacking independ-

ent jurisdictional status. In holding that pendent jurisdiction was available,
the court relied on "Mr. Justice Brennan's language [in Gibbs] and the
54
' However, the Seventh 5
common sense considerations underlying it."
and Ninth Circuits, 6 following precedents using Hum 's "single cause of
action" standard, 57 have expressly held that pendent jurisdiction does not
county fell within the Gibbs discretionary standard because the status of the state
law was unsettled.
50. Compare Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir.
1975) and Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969) with
Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917
(1974) and Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969).
51. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Kelly, 493 F.2d 784, 789 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974); Curtiss v. Everett, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974); Leather's Best, Inc, v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d
800, 809-11 (2d Cir. 1971). For a complete listing of the pendent party cases in this
area, see Note, 62 VA. L. REV. 194, 206 n.69 (1976).
52. 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971).
53. Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit is one of the leading authors of cases
on pendent party jurisdiction. See Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx,
451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971); Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset-Dunlop, Inc., 441 F.2d
627 (2d Cir. 1971). For a general discussion of the Second Circuit pendent party
jurisdiction cases, see Note, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 160-64 (1973).
54. 441 F.2d at 629 (2d Cir. 1971).
55. E.g., Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Wojtas v. Village of Niles, 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964).
56. E.g., Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Hymer v. Chai,
407 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1969). But see Princess Cruises Corp. v. Bayly, Martin &
Fay, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (court in dictum says that Moor v.
County of Alameda should be read to allow pendent parties in the Ninth Circuit).
57. The refusal of both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits to allow pendent party
jurisdiction is based on pre-Gibbs precedent. See Wojtas v. Village of Niles, 334
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extend to allow claims against parties over which no independent basis for
jurisdiction exists.
A division among the federal courts also occurred on the question
whether pendent jurisdiction should be extended to state claims against

governmental entities when the original claims are brought against others
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.58 In Jones v. City of Houma59 a state tort claim

was brought against a municipality as pendent to a federal claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against city police officers. The court held that the state

claim and addition of the municipality as a new party would not fall within
the pendent jurisdiction of the court even though it arose from the same
facts as the federal claim, since the municipality was not a party to the
original claim. 6° An exactly opposite result was reached in Eidschun v.
Pierce6 1 under facts similar to Jones.62

Pendent jurisdiction has also been used by the federal courts in cases
63
where the original jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship.
These cases can be divided into two groups: (1) where there is a lack of
diversity between the pendent party and the party bringing the pendent
claim and (2) where the pendent claim does not meet the monetary
jurisdictional amount.
In situations in which a party brings a pendent claim against a nondiverse party, the use of pendent party jurisdiction has been precluded, in
most instances,' by the complete diversity requirement of Strawbridgev.
F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964); Kataoka v. May Dep't Stores Co., 115 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.
1940).
58. Compare Haber v. Nassau County, 411 F. Supp. 93 (E.D. N.Y. 1976) and
Marvasi v. Shorty, 70 F.R.D. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1976) with Hampton v. City of Chicago,
484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973) and Drennan v. City of Lake Forest, 356 F. Supp. 1277
(N.D. Ill.
1972).
59. 339 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. La. 1972).
60. Id.at 475.
61. 335 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Iowa 1971). See generally Note, 4 U. TOL. L. REV.
201, 211 (1973).
62. 335 F. Supp. at 613-15.
63. E.g., F. C. Stiles Contracting Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 917 (6th Cir.
1970); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972);
Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. .1968).
64. Two cases have allowed the use of pendent party jurisdiction for a plaintiff
to bring a pendent claim against a non-diverse party. Wittersheim v. General
Transp. Serv., Inc., 378 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Va. 1974); Campbell v. Triangle Corp.,
336 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D.Pa. 1972), vacated, 56 F.R.D. 480 (E.D.Pa. 1974). The
Campbell decision isdiscussed inComment, The Federal Courts and the Expanded
Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction, 25 BAYLOR L.REV. 256, 256-57 (1973); Comment,
Pendent Jurisdictionand Minimal Diversity, 58 IOWA L.REV. 179 (1973). Incases
involving family members and closely related claims, the Third Circuit has allowed
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Curtiss.65 Under the Strawbridge rule, any attempt to add a non-diverse
party by the use of pendent jurisdiction would be recognized as a "misuse
of the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.' 66
Pendent party jurisdiction has been used to enable a plaintiff to bring
a pendent claim against an additional party 67 or a pendent party to bring a
claim against the same defendant, 68 when the pendent claims fail to meet
the requisite jurisdictional amount. 69 For example, in Jacobson v. Atlantic
City Hospital7" the plaintiff sued a hospital, a medical corporation, and
two doctors, basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. Only one claim
met the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement, but the court allowed the
remaining two claims and parties to be joined under the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction. 7 Similarly the Tenth Circuit in Niebuhr v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.7 2 allowed an accident victim
whose claim failed to meet the jurisdictional amount to pend his claim to
another plaintiff's claim that exceeded the amount since both personal
injury claims "arose out of the same accident. 7 3 The use of pendent party
jurisdiction in circumstances where the jurisdictional amount is lacking
must now be viewed in light of the Supreme Court decision in Zahn v.
International Paper CO. 7 4 The plaintiffs in Zahn brought a class action
suit based on diversity jurisdiction, but the claims of some members of the
class did not meet the requisite jurisdictional amount. The Court, relying
a "pendent" plaintiff to bring a claim against a non-diverse party. See Borror v.
Sharon Steel Co., 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964) (survival action brought by a tutor; the
child's mother, as a pendent plaintiff, was allowed to bring a pendent wrongful
death action even though no diversity existed between the mother and the defendant); Newman v. Freeman, 262 F. Supp. 106, 108-09 (E.D. Pa. 1966). Contra,
Olivieri v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
65. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
66. Parker v. W.W. Moore & Sons, Inc., 528 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1975) (Wittersheim use of pendent jurisdiction was not valid). With the Moore decision invalidating Wittersheim and the vacating of the Campbell decision, the two major challenges to Strawbridge in the area of pendent jurisdiction have been negated.
67. E.g., Beautytuft, Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1122, 1128 (6th Cir.
1970); F.C. Stiles Contracting Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1970);
Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
68. E.g., Niebuhr v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 486 F.2d 618, 621 (10th
Cir. 1973); Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1971).
69. The amount in controversy must exceed $10,000 in a diversity action under
28 U.S.C. § 1332. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 32 at 107-10.
70. 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968).
71. Id. at 153-55.
72. 486 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1973).
73. Id. at 621. See also Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289, 291 (3d Cir. 1971).
74. 414 U.S. 291 (1973). See generally Theis, Zahn v. InternationalPaperCo.:
The Non-Aggregation Rule in Jurisdictional Amount Cases, 35 LA. L." REV. 89
(1974).
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on the rule that "multiple plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims must
each satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement," 75 held that each
member of the class action suit must meet the requisite jurisdictional
amount and any plaintiff failing to meet this amount should be dismissed
from the case. 76 There was no discussion by the majority of whether
ancillary or pendent party jurisdiction could be used in such circumstances, 77 but the Court's broad language makes suspect the practice of
using pendent party jurisdiction if the pendent claim fails to meet the
jurisdictional amount requirement .78
A doctrine closely related to pendent jurisdiction is that of ancillary
jurisdiction 79 which is premised on the notion that a court acquiring
jurisdiction of a case or controversy may decide any "ancillary" matters,
although it would not have jurisdiction over these matters if they were
raised independently. 80 In the leading case of Freeman v. Howe,81 the
Supreme Court was faced with the question of determining the rights of
parties whose property interests are or may be affected by a case currently
in federal court. The court recognized that a party with such property
interests could bring his claim as ancillary and dependent to the federal
claim even though no independent jurisdiction extended over this claim.
Freeman and its progeny required a direct relationship between the ancil82
lary claim and the property in the court's possession.
75. 414 U.S. at 294 (1973).

76. Id. at 301.
77. Justice Brennan in his dissent argued that under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (2)
ancillary jurisdiction could be used for joining members of the class who fail to
meet the jurisdictional amount.
78. See Osbahr v. H & M Construction, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 621,623 (N.D. Iowa
1975) (since Zahn, "pendent jurisdiction may no longer be extended over additional
parties against whom a separate claim falls short of the requisite jurisdictional
amount"); Freeman v. Gordon and Breach Science Publ., Inc., 398 F. Supp. 519
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Zahn has foreclosed the invocation of pendent party jurisdiction
to sustain federal jurisdiction over a diversity claim not in excess of $10,000");
United Pacific Reliance Ins. Co. v. Lewiston, 372 F. Supp. 700, 704 (D. Idaho
1974). But see Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 842
(1974) (in dictum court implied that a wife's claim lacking jurisdictional amount
could be brought with her husband's claim since both arose out of the same
operative facts); Afton Alps, Inc. v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 543, 546 n.2 (D.
Minn. 1974).
79. Some commentators have argued that there is no real difference between
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction after the Gibbs decision. See Baker, supra note
6; Pendent Jurisdiction and Ancillary Jurisdiction, supra note 10.
80. See WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 9 at 19-21.
81. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
82. See, e.g., Fulton Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925). See also
WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 9 at 19-21.
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The scope of the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine was considerably
enlarged in 1926 by Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange83 where the
question was whether a counterclaim, under Equity Rule 30, to a federal
antitrust claim could be retained by the court after the federal claim was
dismissed even though the counterclaim had no independent jurisdictional
basis. Reasoning that the two claims arose out of the same transaction, the
Court found the counterclaim to be within its jurisdiction.84 Moore is
important because it changed the emphasis of ancillary jurisdiction from a
property-related rule into a rule of convenience to be used in conjunction
with the procedural mechanisms of the federal courts.
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1933,
new possibilities for the use of ancillary jurisdiction were realized. 85 Since
the Federal Rules cannot extend or create jurisdiction, 6 its many joinder
provisions would have been of limited utility if no method was available to
allow joinder of parties not independently meeting the federal jurisdictional requirements. The Moore decision, however, and its expanded
use of ancillary jurisdiction to include a counterclaim under Equity Rule
30, provided ample basis for the broad use of ancillary jurisdiction in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain provisions allowing for
parties to be added or joined in a lawsuit under Rules 13(h), 14, 19, 20,
and 24. A brief survey of these rules will demonstrate in what situations
ancillary jurisdiction has been used and what criteria are used for its
application. Since both ancillary jurisdiction, in connection with the Federal Rules, and pendent jurisdiction may be used in cases where the
original claim jurisdiction is based on a federal question, an attempt will
be made to ascertain how the criteria to be used under the two doctrines
compare and whether any "principled differences" exist.
Under Rule 13(h) ,88 persons other than the original parties in an
action may be made parties to a cross-claim or counterclaim. By using
ancillary jurisdiction, a party may be joined even though the claim inde83. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
84. Id. at 608.
85. See Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdictionand the Joinderof Claims in the Federal
Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27, 28 (1963).
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 82; See also WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 9 at 20.
87. See Fraser, supra note 85. See generally Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v.
Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633 (3d Cir. 1961); Heintz & Co. v. Provident
Tradesman Bank & Trust Co., 30 F.R.D. 171, 173 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(h): "Persons other than those made parties to the
original action may be made parties to a counterclaim or crossclaim .... "
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pendently would not meet the court's jurisdictional requirements. 8 9 The
test used by the courts to determine if ancillary jurisdiction may be applied
to join a party in a counterclaim or cross-claim, is whether this claim
"arose out of the same transaction or occurrence" as the original claim
and is logically related to a common origin. 90 An example of adding
parties to a counterclaim under Rule 13(h), when the original action was
based on a federal claim, can be found in United States v. Paul Tishman
Co. 91 Through the use of ancillary jurisdiction, the court allowed a
defendant to a claim brought under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270(A),
(B), to join additional parties to his counterclaim although there was no
independent federal jurisdictional basis for this claim. 92 The courts allowing joinder of additional parties under Rule 13(h) base their decisions on
"fairness and considerations of convenience and of economy." 93 The
criteria for using ancillary jurisdiction under Rule 13(h) and the Gibbs
criteria for pendent jurisdiction are extremely similar, if not the same.
Both standards require the "pendent or ancillary" claim to arise out of
same transaction or occurrence and to be related to a "common origin" or
"common nucleus of operative fact."- 94 The two doctrines are also comparable in that both can be used in situations where a non-federal claim is
brought in connection with a federal question claim. Also, the judicial
basis for both doctrines is embedded in considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness.
Rule 1491 allows a defendant to add as a third-party defendant a party
who he asserts is liable to him for all or part of the original claim. 96 The
89. See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE-CIVIL RULES 13.39 [hereinafter cited
as MOORE]; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 1436 at 191.
90. E.g., Pipeliners Local Union No. 798 v. Ellerd, 503 F.2d 1193, 1199 (10th
Cir. 1974). See also Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d
631, 633 (3d Cir. 1961); Hoosier Gas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Iowa
1952).
91. 32 F.R.D. 223 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
92. Id. at 226.
93. See Pipeliners Local Union No. 798 v. Ellerd, 503 F.2d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir.
1974); Weber v. Weber, 44 F.R.D. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
94. Compare the ancillary criteria used in Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert
Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633 (3d Cir. 1961), with the pendent criteria of UMW v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 14: "At any time after commencement of the action a
defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to
be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for
all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him ....
"
96. See MOORE, supra note 89, at 14.25; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, §
1444 at 215.
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ancillary jurisdiction rule as applied to a third-party defendant is best
exemplified in Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co. 9 7 where the court held that a third party claim is within its
ancillary jurisdiction when the claim bears a "logical relationship to the
98
aggregate core of operative facts which constitute the main claim."
Thus, it is the relationship of the claim to the original transaction which
determines whether or not ancillary jurisdiction will be extended to a third
party claim. 99 In Schwab v. Erie Lackwanna Railroad Co. 10° one issue
was whether a defendant could bring a state claim for damages against a
third party defendant when the original action of the plaintiff was based on
a violation of the Federal Employees Liability Act. The court held that
since both claims arose out of the same transaction or occurrence, the
defendant could assert a state claim against the third party defendant.' 0 '
The policy behind the decision was stated in terms of judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness to the parties. 10 2 A close association between
the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine under Rule 14 and the Gibbs doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction is evident. 0 3 From a practical standpoint, there is
little, if any, difference between the ancillary requirement of a "logical
relationship to the aggregate core of operative fact'"" and the pendent
requirement of a "common nucleus of operative fact." 10 5 To the thirdparty defendant it would seem to make little difference whether it is the
defendant or the plaintiff who is bringing the state claim against him, for
his defense must be lodged in federal court either way.
The joinder of parties needed for the just adjudication of a suit is
allowed by Rule 19.1°' Any party who claims an interest relating to the
97. 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970).
98. Id. at 714.
99. See Heintz & Co. v. Provident Tradesman Bank & Trust Co., 30 F.R.D.
171, 173-74 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
100. 438 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1971).
101. Id.at 70.
102. Id. at 68.
103. See Note, 57 VA. L. REV. 265, 282-89 (1971) (concludes that the same
considerations are used in determining ancillary jurisdiction under Rule 14 and
pendent jurisdiction under the Gibbs Doctrine).
104. Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 714
(5th Cir. 1970).
105. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a): "A person ... whose joinder will not deprive the
court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party
in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is
so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical
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subject of the action, and whose absence might impede his ability to
protect his interest or lead to multiple litigation, may be joined as a party
under Rule 19(a)(2). °7 While a party will not be allowed to join if his
joinder will deprive the court of jurisdiction,108 he does not need an
independent jurisdictional basis. For example, in Jacobs v. United
States, 09 a plaintiff was allowed to join a party over whom the court had
no independent jurisdictional basis. Since the original claim was under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, a state claim against the joined party defendant
was allowed. The court reasoned that even though both the plaintiff and
the joined party defendant were citizens of the same state, the court's
jurisdiction was not destroyed since the original claim was based upon
federal question and not diversity jurisdiction."' It was implied that
joinder would not have been allowed had the case been based on diversity
jurisdiction."' A similar result was reached in Reserve Mining Co. v.
Environmental Protection Agency"l2 where a joined party plaintiff was
allowed to assert a state claim against the defendant even though there was
no independent jurisdictional basis for the claim.I" 3 In both cases, justification for the use of ancillary jurisdiction was based on policies of
"judicial economy, federalism, and equity."..". While the limits of the
criteria for the use of ancillary jurisdiction under Rule 19 are narrower
than the Gibbs pendent jurisdiction criteria, the basic policy considerations behind the two doctrines are the same-economy and convenience
of the court. An overlap between the pendent and ancillary doctrines can
also be seen in that ancillary jurisdiction under Rule 19 is used to allow a
party to be joined to a state claim when jurisdiction is originally based on a
federal question claim. It is this joining of a state claim to a federal
question claim that forms the core of the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.
For intervention under Rule 24,1 15the use of ancillary jurisdiction has
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest."
107. See MOORE, supra note 89, at 19.04; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, §
1610 at 94.

108. FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
109. 367 F.Supp. 1275 (D. Ariz. 1973).
110. Id. at 1279.
111. Id.

112. 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
113. Id. at 522 n.55.
114. Jacobs v. United States, 367 F.Supp. 1275, 1284 (D. Ariz. 1973).
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a): "Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted
to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an
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generally been limited to situations in which there is a "joinder of right"
meeting the test of Rule 24(a)." l6 For a party to qualify to intervene of
right, three conditions must be satisfied." I7 The party must (1) claim a
"significantly protectable interest"l"8 relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the original action; (2) be so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair his ability to
protect that interest; and (3) show that his interest is not adequately
represented by the existing parties to the suit. Thus, the standards of
ancillary jurisdiction under Rule 24 are much more restrictive than the
Gibbs pendent jurisdiction test and bear a resemblance to the stringent preMoore criteria for the use of ancillary jurisdiction." 9 For example, in
Finance Company of America v. ParkHolding Corp, 2 0 the court held that
the possibility of the federal suit impairing the intervenor's right to recover
damages was not sufficient to support the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction
under Rule 24. Despite these strict standards, there remain situations in
which ancillary jurisdiction under Rule 24 can be used to allow a party to
intervene in an action based on a federal claim even though his interest is
12
of a non-federal nature. 1
In summary, the criteria and reasoning used by the court in analyzing
ancillary jurisdiction in connection with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce22
dure and pendent jurisdiction are marked by a great degree of similarity.' 1
The practical difference between the Gibbs pendent criteria and the ancillary criteria under Rule 13(h) and Rule 14 is nonexistent. A relationship to
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating
to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties."
116.

See MOORE, supra note 89, at

24.18; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, §

1917 at 584.
117. See, e.g., Reedsburg Bank v. Apollo, 508 F.2d 995, 997-98 (7th Cir. 1975).
118. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 539 (1971).
119. The test under Rule 24 (a) requiring a party seeking to intervene to have an
interest related to "property or a transaction" which is the subject of the original
action is similar to the interest in property requirement for ancillary jurisdiction
under Freeman v. Howe. See the text at notes 82-84, supra.
120. 60 F.R.D. 504 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
121. See, e.g., Badger State Mut. Cas. Co. v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 1226,
1228 (E.D. Wis. 1974) ("court has ancillary jurisdiction over the intervening defendant's claim irrespective of the fact that it does not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements of this court").
122. See Baker, supra note 6, at 765; Pendent Jurisdictionand Ancillary Jurisdiction, supra note 10, at 1272.
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a common transaction or set of facts and considerations of judicial efficiency are the bases for the use of both doctrines. This relationship, can
also be seen between the use of ancillary jurisdiction under Rule 19 and
pendent jurisdiction, even though the use of ancillary jurisdiction is more
restrictive in this instance. Under the Federal Rules, ancillary jurisdiction
has been used to add parties lacking independent jurisdictional basis to a
federal question claim in the same manner and under similar circumstances as pendent jurisdiction has been used to join a state claim in federal
23

question cases.'
Due to the similarity between the ancillary and pendent jurisdiction
doctrines after Gibbs, the permissive joinder of parties under Rule 20124
has been allowed through the use of "pendent party" jurisdiction, even
though the joined parties did not independently meet federal jurisdictional
requirements.' 25 In opposition to this practice, some courts have questioned whether a party may be properly added to a suit under the rubric of
pendent jurisdiction. 26 It is this confusion which prompted the United
v. Howard 27 to
States Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Aldinger
1 28
"resolve the conflict on this important question."
In Aldinger, 29 the Court attempted to answer the question whether
pendent jurisdiction may be used to add a party not within the court's
jurisdiction to a state claim "pendent" to a valid federal claim. Plaintiff
brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that her firing by the
123. The criteria for allowing a party to be joined under Rules 13(h) and 14 are,
for practical purposes, the same as the criteria established by Gibbs for pendent
jurisdiction. Therefore, when a non-federal claim or party is to be joined to a
federal question claim, no different results should occur whether the device used is
called ancillary or pendent jurisdiction.
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a): "All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if
they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, . . . and if any question of law or
fact common to all these persons will arise in the action. All persons may be joined
in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in
the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, [or] occurrence, . . . and if any question of law or fact comnmon to all
"
defendants will arise in the action ..
125. All of the pendent party jurisdiction cases would fall within the permissive
joinder allowed by Rule 20.
126. There is a split over whether permissive joinder of parties should be
allowed by use of pendent party jurisdiction. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have
continued to oppose such joinder while the other circuits have permitted it. See
notes 44, 55, & 56, supra.
127. 423 U.S. 823 (1975).
128. Id.
129. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
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county treasurer violated her constitutional rights. Using the Gibbs pendent jurisdiction test and the power of the court under ancillary jurisdiction
to bring in an additional party, plaintiff attempted to add a state claim
(arising out of the same "common nucleus of operative fact" as her
federal claim) against the county, which was not otherwise within the
court's jurisdiction. 3 ° Noting that lower courts in such circumstances
have relied on pendent party jurisdiction, the Court decided the case solely
in light of the Gibbs pendent jurisdiction standard.' No answer was
given to whether the pendent party could have been brought in under the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. Instead the Court said that it would be
profitless to distinguish between the use of the doctrines of pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction in this case or to decide, in fact, if there are any
"principled differences" between the two doctrines. 132
The Court's analysis centered on the legal distinctions that exist when
pendent jurisdiction is used to add a party and when it is used to add a
claim. In both situations, the power of the court is derived from article III
of the Constitution. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Rehnquist stated
that when pendent jurisdiction is used to add only a non-federal claim
against a party over which jurisdiction already exists, the court's power is
restricted solely by the language of article 11111 because no congressional
enactment has restricted what claims may be brought by parties already
properly in federal court. This judicial freedom allowed in adding claims
does not apply, however, to situations in which parties are to be added.
The Court reasoned that Congress has by statute limited the situations in
which federal jurisdiction is extended to certain parties. The Court stated
that if a federal statute excludes a certain class from the jurisdiction of the
federal court on the original claim, then that class is excluded from being
34
brought into the court as a party to any non-federal claim.'
Following this reasoning, Justice Rehnquist addressed the question
whether the plaintiff could bring her pendent state claim against the
county. Since the county is excluded from the list of "persons" answerable to plaintiff under her original cause of action, 42 U.S.C. §
1983,'135 the majority held that Congress had impliedly restricted the court
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at

135.

See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365

12.
13-16.
13.
13-14.
16-17.

U.S. 167 (1961). The Monroe decision has been criticized insofar as it interpreted
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 as preventing a government
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from extending pendent party jurisdiction to it. The holding of the Court
therefore was limited to forbidding the federal courts from using pendent
party jurisdiction with respect to a claim brought against a governmental
entity under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.136
Justice Brennan, the author of Gibbs, dissented and argued that
pendent party jurisdiction does exist and should be used in the Aldinger
situation because the Gibbs rule was broad enough to include the joinder
of parties.1 37 The Court's holding, according to Justice Brennan, resulted
in an arbitrary or "per se" rule made only to forbid pendent parties if the
original claim was based on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §
1983.138 The true construction of that statute was questioned by the
dissent, which interpreted the legislative history as not totally precluding
39
federal jurisdiction over governmental entities.
After Aldinger, the question remains whether the use of pendent
party jurisdiction is valid and, if so, how broad its application is. The
answer must be found in the broad language and implicit principles of the
decision, since the court carefully avoided any direct answer. The Court
initially stated that it would make no attempt to decide if any "principled
differences" exist between the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction."4 Because of the many ways and varied conditions in which the
two doctrines can be used, the Court found it unnecessary to decide if, in
fact, after Gibbs there are any differences in the doctrines of pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction in a case based on a federal question claim. If it is
unnecessary to differentiate between ancillary and pendent jurisdiction in
federal question cases, the question remains as to how and when new
parties, lacking an independent jurisdictional basis, may be joined in a
case based on a federal claim. 4 By the use of ancillary jurisdiction under
entity from being held liable under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. See Kates & Kouba, Liability

of Public Entities under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131,
132-36, 161-67 (1972); Note, 4 U. TOL. L. REV. 201, 209 (1973).
136. 427 U.S. at 18-19.
137. Id. at 20-21.
138. Id. at 22.
139. Id. at 23-27.
140. Id. at 13.
141. Since Aldinger requires a strict statutory construction of the federal statute
upon which the claim is based, pendent party jurisdiction still will not be allowed in
diversity cases involving a non-diverse pendent party because a strict construction
of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as shown by Strawbridge, would require complete diversity.
See Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977) (a post-Aldinger decision).
Aldinger would tend to restrict the use of pendent party jurisdiction in diversity
cases where the pendent claim does not meet the jurisdictional amount, since a
strict reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 would require each claim to meet the $10,000
limit. See note 78, supra.
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the Federal Rules, parties lacking an independent jurisdictional basis can
be added to non-federal claims in a federal question suit. 14 2 Under Rule
13(h), a defendant to a federal claim may bring a counterclaim on a state
matter and join an additional party, even though the added party and
counterclaim would not have independently been allowed in federal
court. 14 3 Similarly, a third-party defendant, lacking independent jurisdictional basis, may be brought into court under Rule 14 to defend not only
against his liability to the defendant on the original federal claim but also
against any state claim the defendant may bring connected to the federal
claim.'" Further, by use of Rule 19, a party may be joined in an action in
federal court even though he would not have independently met the federal
jurisdictional requirements. 145 Intervention into a federal suit based on a
federal question claim is allowed by Rule 24, in spite of the fact that no
independent jurisdictional basis exists for the intervenor.' 46 Since the
Court in Aldinger, deciding a federal question case, found it unnecessary
to differentiate between ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, it is reasonable
to conclude that if a party may be added to a state claim in a federal
question suit under Federal Rules 13(h), 14, 19, and 24 by use of ancillary
jurisdiction, then he may also be joined to a state claim pendent to a
federal question claim under Rule 20 by use of pendent jurisdiction,
especially since the same basic criteria and principles support both doctrines. 4 7 It would logically follow that, since Aldinger only precluded the
use of pendent party jurisdiction where Congress has excluded federal
jurisdiction over certain parties,148 in all other areas where ancillary
jurisdiction is not precluded, pendent party jurisdiction is also available.
Aldinger, therefore, should be read as an extension of the Gibbs pendent
jurisdiction standard to include the joinder of parties as well as claims in
areas where Congress has not expressly or impliedly negated such jurisdiction.
While Aldinger represents an expansion of the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine, it may, however, restrict the use of ancillary jurisdiction because
of the Court's reliance on statutory intent to decide if a party may be joined
142. See the text at notes 88-123, supra.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Paul Tishman Co., 32 F.R.D. 223 (E.D.N.Y.
1963).
144. See, e.g., Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 438 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1971).
145. See, e.g., Jacobs v. United States, 367 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Ariz. 1973).
146. See, e.g., Badger State Mut. Cas. Co. v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 1226
(E.D. Wis. 1974).
147. See the text at notes 88-123, supra.
148. 427 U.S. at 18-19.
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in a federal case. If a party is precluded from being brought into the federal
court's jurisdiction because congressional statutory intent or expression
negates the existence of jurisdiction over him, an anomaly would be
created if this preclusion applied only to pendent party jurisdiction and not
to ancillary jurisdiction. Unless the language of the Court is meant to limit
the use of ancillary jurisdiction as well as pendent party jurisdiction in
cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 49 there is no logical basis for its
conclusion, since the Court found it unnecessary to decide if any "principled differences" existed between ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. If
it was the intent of Congress not to allow the courts to extend any type of
jurisdiction over a governmental entity when the original claim is based on
42 U.S.C. § 1983, there can be no reasonable basis for allowing the
governmental entity to be joined under Rules 13(h), 14, 19, or 24 by use
of ancillary jurisdiction yet not allowing this same party to be joined under
Rule 20 by use of pendent party jurisdiction. Without a restriction on
ancillary as well as pendent party jurisdiction, the decision would appear
to be no more than a means of judicial over-stepping of reason and logic to
achieve a desired result.
The Aldinger decision may represent an attempt by the Court to halt
the "flood of suits" being brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871150
and the jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Due to the broad
language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the lack of a jurisdictional amount
requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), the two statutes have been used
151
with increased frequency as the basis for access to the federal courts.
Some deterrence, however, has been created by the decision in Aldinger
in that the Court has established an arbitrary rule that pendent party
jurisdiction as to governmental entities will not be allowed when the
original claim is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).151
149. There is a possibility that the rule preventing pendent party jurisdiction
over governmental entities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may apply only when the claim is
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 45 U.S.L.W. 4079 (1977) (Justice Rehnquist suggests that a federal court
may have jurisdiction on a claim against a school district under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
when the claim is brought by use of 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
150. See Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction:A FederalJudge's
Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity, and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & SOCIAL
ORDER 557, 558-59 (1973); McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations
on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part I, 60 VA. L. REV. 1
(1974).
151. See note 150, supra.
152. A person with a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a valid state claim
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A more satisfactory result could have been reached without resort to
an arbitrary rule by use of the Gibbs power-discretion test. Under the
Gibbs standard, the lower federal court judge is given a broad discretion to
53
decide whether or not to permit the joinder of a pendent party or claim. 1
The dismissal of the pendent party in Aldinger could easily have been
accomplished by the use of the discretionary power of the judge rather
than the development of an arbitrary rule.' 54 It is also possible that,
through a broad use of this discretionary power, a federal district judge
could effectively and efficiently control any increase in his already overcrowded dockets which may result from the recognition of pendent party
jurisdiction. While being efficient, the discretionary provision of Gibbs
would safeguard state interests, since in cases where the state law is
unsettled or where the federal claim is dismissed before
trial, the federal
55
judge has a mandate to dismiss the pendent claim. 1
In an age when both federal and state courts are overcrowded, it
seems contrary to policies of judicial efficiency and justice to require a
person to bring a federal claim and a related state claim in two different
courts, thus requiring two time-consuming trials, when both claims could
be conveniently and effectively settled by one court. While adding to
judicial waste by requiring two trials instead of one, Aldinger will also
add an increased burden on the federal judiciary. A federal judge, before
allowing a pendent party to be joined, must now determine not only if
there is a "common nucleus of operative fact" but also what is the express
and implied meaning of the statute upon which the federal claim is based.
The difficulty of this evaluation can be seen in the diverse positions taken
by the majority and dissent in Aldinger when they attempted to determine
the implied congressional intent of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.156 By not allowing
pendent party jurisdiction "per se" when a claim is brought under 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and by the establishment of a
against a governmental entity will be forced to file separate state and federal suits
instead of being able to have both claims settled in federal court. This extra expense
and time consumption will deter some persons from bringing their federal suit in
federal court.
153. The Gibbs standard suggests that a federal judge should exercise his discretion not to hear a pendent state claim when the federal claim is dismissed before
trial, if the state claim substantially predominates, if the state law is unsettled, or if
the addition of the state claim would lead to jury confusion.
154. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715 (1973).
155. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966).
156. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 16-18, 23-37 (1976).
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difficult statutory evaluation rule, the Court has created a standard leading
to judicial waste and possible injustice, while a further recognition of the
discretionary power of the federal judges would allow for "judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants."
Guy Holdridge

AT7ORNEY DISQUALIFICATION AT THE GRAND JURY

The novel question of disqualifying an attorney for conflict of interest
at the grand jury stage of a prosecution has been addressed in three recent
cases, Pirillo v. Takiff, 1 In re Investigation Before the April 1975 Grand
Jury, 2 and In re Gopman. 3 The courts expressed particular concern that
conflict-laden representation would obstruct the free flow of information
to the grand jury by encouraging a "stonewall" of silence. The reasoning
is that a "stonewall" might develop as a result of an attorney's simultaneously representing a number of grand jury witnesses and potential defendants since the attorney's interest in defending one client prevents him
from counseling another client to testify freely or to seek immunity in
exchange for testimony. Thus a conspiracy of silence is created, particularly when one attorney represents all of the witnesses called before the
grand jury. Non-disclosure is also encouraged when an attorney represents
an outside institutional body which has an interest in halting the investigation while he simultaneously represents a witness before the grand jury. 4
1. 462 Pa. 511, 341 A. 2d 896 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
2. 403 F. Supp. 1176 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
3. 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976).
4. Although Rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure precludes an
attorney from being present when his client testifies before the grand jury, a
witness may confer with his attorney before and after giving testimony. A common
practice is to allow the witness to leave the grand jury room and speak with his
attorney when he is unsure as to how to answer a question. In United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976), the court seemingly ratified this procedure
stating, "Respondent was also informed that if he desired he could have the
assistance of counsel but that counsel could not be inside the grand jury room. That
statement was plainly a correct recital of the law."
For circuit court approval of allowing witnesses to confer with their attorneys
outside the grand jury room see United States v. George, 444 F.2d 310 (6th Cir.
1971); United States v. Weinberg, 439 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1971); Perrone v. United
States, 416 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1969).

